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SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR
AND HUMAN RESOURCES

TESTIMONY OF ACTING CHAIRMAN J. CLAY SMITH, JR.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT·OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE

APRIL 21, 1981

;

. f,I

,\ ;.·
r'r t -,
~

I am

J::

Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Equal
'

..

Employment Opportunity Commission.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a five-member
bipartisan

C~ission

administration and

having principal responsibility for the

en~orcement

of Federal laws prohibiting

~

discrimination. in employment, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Since the early days of our

existence as an agency, we have recognized that harassment in the'
workplace,

whi~h

is based on race, religion, national origin,

color, or sex, constitutes a violation of Title VII be·cause it
imposes an adverse term or condition of employment on one class
of people which is not imposed on any- other classes of people.
It unfairly handicaps and disadvantages those people against whom
it is directed, often making it impossible for ·them to perform
their jobs.

While the Commission continues to actively oppose

harassment in the workplace on any Title VII basis, I will limit
my testimony today to harassment on the basis of sex which takes
the form of sexual harassment.

That sexual.narassment is widespread 1.s not to be denied.
According to Lin Farley, the author of Sexual Shak,edown t "In May
1975 the Women's Affairs Section of the Human Affairs Program at
Cornell 'University "distributed the first questiJnnaire ever
devoted solely to the

topi~

of sexual harassment ... 70 percent
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(of the respondents had) personally
harassment". 11

experi~nced

some. form of

In 1976, Redbook magazine published a question-

naire on sexual harassment to which over 9,000 women responded.

, one in ten report'ed
1
unwanted sexuAL attentions on the job.2!
Of this numbe

t~at

tically significant

st~dy

they had experienced
Additionally, a statis-

conducted by the U.S'. Merit Systems

Protection Board shows that during the two years prior to the
survey, which was done in early 1980, 42 percent of .all federally
employed women
se~ual

surveyed reported that they were

vict~s

of

harassment.l1 Also during the late 1970's cases .involving

sexual harassment were decided in six Federal Circuit Courts and
~

seven additional cases were decided in Federal District Courts.

In addition to this activity in the courts, in 1979 the
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service held hearings on sexual harassment in
the Federal government.

These hearings

establi~hed

that sexual

harassment was widespread in the Federal government and established
the need for guidance from our Commission with respect to this
issue.

The Commission realized, however, that any guidance which

was issued with respect to sexual harassment would necessarily
apply equally to all employers covered by Title VII, and we
;

further realized, from the activity in the courtfo, that both
public and private employers were in need of help in understanding
and defining their liability for acts of sexual harassment in
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the workplace and were in need of help in determining' how to
mitigate that liability.
guidelines should

b~

Therefore, the Commission decided that

issued to give employers notice of the

guidance and to give them an opportunity to comment along with
other member, of the public and Federal agencies.

Since guide-

.'

lines are regularly published in the Federal Register for public
notice and comment and.. are also regularly circulated to Federal
agencies for comment, this format appeared to be the vehicle
which would best serve the interests of all concerned.

On April 11, 1980, the interim guidelines were published in

the Federal Register for a 60 day period for public comment. In
addition to the comments received from Federal agencies, the
Commission received 168 letters in response to this publication.
These comments came from persons throughout
sectors.

th~

public and private

The single most prevalent group of comments took the

form of praise for the Commission for publishing guidelines on
the issue of sexual harassment and for the
lines.

c~ntent

of the guide-

The Commission was gratified by this high degree of

favorable response which the guidelines elicited, recognizing
that this was an

~nusual

phenomenon in recent Federal experience.

The Final Guidelines were published in the Federal Register
•

November 10, 1980.

I will discuss them now,

se~tion-by-section.

The first subs'ection of the guidelines' states that sexual harassment is a violation of Titie VII and defines sexual harassment as
follows:
-3-
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Un~elcome

sexual advances, requests for

sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submi~ion

to such conduct is made either

ex~licitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment)
(2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting
such indiviudal, or (3) such conduct has
t~e pu~ose

or effect of unreasonably

interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an

intimidating~

hostile, or offensive working e.nvironment.

A number of

pe~sons

who responded t9 the publication of the

guidelines suggested that this definition of sexual' harassment
.--

should be more specific both as a general proposition and as a
means for strengthening the guidelines, particularly with regard.
to §1604.ll(a) (3)., - the section which provides that, "Unwelcome
sexual adyances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature

.

constitut~

harassment

when ... such conduct- has the purpose or effect Jf unreasonably
interfering with an

indiv~dual's·

work performance or creating

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
I

-'T-

,

"\

•
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These comments were carefully considered by the Commission, and
after much consideration, the Commission 4ecided that the definition should stand as written, with one word changed for the sake
of clarity.

This conclusion was based on two factors.

First,

the Commissiop has held in, its decisions that this definition is
~

.

.

applicable in cases of ,. harassment based on national origin', race,
and religion, since 1968, 1969, and 1971, respectively 4/, and
the courts have also recognized this form of harassment as discriminatory.~/

At this time, the Commission sees no justification

for treating harassment based on sex any differently than harassment
based on race, religion, color, or national origin, for we agree
with the following statement contained in the report of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare when Title VII was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972:

II • • •

discrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and ... it is to be accorded the
same degree of

~oncern

given to any type of

sim~larly

unlawful

conduct. lt §j One court recognized this specific form of sexual
harassment prior to the issuance of the guidelines7/, and at
least two courts have supported the definition since the guidelines were issued.S/

The second factor that played a part in the 1 Commission's
determination was the difficulty inherent in

fr~ing

a specific

definition which does not include behavior which is perfectly
acceptable social behavior and has no relevance at all to Title
VII.

This difficulty is due to the fact that tpe same actions
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which, under one set of circumstances, would

cons~itute

sexual

harassment, might, under another set of circumstances, constitute
acceptable social behavior.

Also, this is a developing area of

the law, and the Commission wanted to give guidance without being
so

definitiv~

that the guidelines would require amendments with

t

each new development.

as stated in Subsection (b) of

Rath~r,
~

the guidelines, the Commission will consider"each case alleging
sexual harassment on a 'case-by-case basis and consider such
. factors as the nature of the alleged 'sexual advances and the
context in which they occurred.

This way the Commission will be

able to issue and publish fact-specific decisions and further'
clarify and refine the definition through examples and

dis~ussion

contained in the decisions.

Since the publication of the final guidelines in November
1980, the Commission has issued three decisions.9/
current~y

We are

considering a fourth decision for issuance, and I have

instructed staff to present additional decisions to the Commission
for consideration so as to provide additional guidance for the
public.

These decisions all speak to areas of the guidelines

which the Commission

consi~ers

appropriate for further development

or explanation through the kind of discussion that is not possible
in a set of guidelines but is necessary to the
individual charge of discrimination.
well developed,

fact-speci~ic

~esolution

I

of an

The Commission feels that

decisions are the appropriate

vehicles for further refining the definition of sexual harassment.
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The guiaelines follow the well established common law
standard of respondeat superior.

That is, they state that an

employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and
agents.

This responsibility exists regardless of the existence

of circumstances which would be mitigating factors if the person

. who

f

committed! the acts were not a supervisor or an agent, e.g.

lack of knowledge of the acts on the part of the employer or
publication 9£ a policy prohibiting the acts.

This is the

standard which the courts -have previously applied in all area·s of
..

Title VII law.
standard in

It is true that some courts failed to apply this

s~al

harassment cases at the outset of the develop-

ment of this legal is-sue; however, it should be noted that some
courts were initially slow to

g~ant

sexual harassment the same

legal status as other Title VII issues on any front.

Moreover, some courts did apply the respondeat superior
doctrine prior to the issuance of the guidelines.

For example,

one court stated in 1976, "For, if this (sexual'harassment) was a
policy or practice of the plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the
(employer's) policy or practice, which is prohibited by Title
VII "'1.Q./

In other early sexual harassment cases the courts concluded

.

that, " ... respondeat·superior does apply here, wiere the
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to
hire, fire, discipline or promQte, or at least to participate in
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or recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor
~is

said to

h~ve

done violates company policy"'ll/ and that·,

'''Generally speaking, an employer is chargeable with Title
VII violations occasioned by discriminatory practices of
personnel. "12l

supe~isory

The comments which dealt with

employer li4bility for acts of supervisors and agents were
~

read in conjunction with court precedent and Commission
policy in this and all other areas of Title VII law, and the
·Commission concluded that. there was no justification for
distinguishing the issue of sexual harassment from other
Title VII issues.

The application of the principle of

respon~eat

superior

in Title VII law is -far less onerous than in other areas of
law, such as tort law, because there are no provisions in
Title VII for punitive or compensatory damages, either as
money payable to the employee above an4 beyond that which is
actually lost or as fines.

This means that where an employer

knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been committed
by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results
of those actions, a further remedy under Title VII would be
unlikely in the administrative process.

Clearly, the Commission

would not sue for a remedy which has already been

~ranted.

'J
Let me, at this point,

~o

back to the interim guidelines.

As originally published, Subsection (d) of the guidelines
provided that:

With respect to persons other than those
mentioned in subsection (c) above, (that

is,

~upervisors

and agents), an employer

is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer,
or its agents or supervisory employees,
kno*s
or should have known of the conduct .
. !
An. employer may rebut apparent liability

for such acts by showing that it took
immediate and

appropri~te

corrective action.

The comments we received showed that we needed to clarify what we
meant by our reference to "persons other than," and so we rewrote
l~ited

Subsection (d) and

harassment by co-workers.

it to cover liability for sexual
We retained the provision that sets

out the requirement for actual or constructive knowledge on the
part of employer·and the provision for a defense which consists:
of a showing that the employer took immediate and .appropriate
corrective action when it discovered the violation.

Then we

added a new Subsection (e) to cover actions by persons who do not
work for the employer, e.g., persons who regularly come to repair
equipment or make deliveries at an employer's facility and harass
an employee

whil~

they are on the employer's premises.

We also

retained the requirement in this subsection that employers have
knowledge before liability can vest 'and retainedlthe provision
.

J

for a defense consisting of a showing of
priate corrective action.

~ediate

and appro-

In :~ddition, we expanded the pro~,

visions of the original subsection to state that, "in reviewing
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these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the
employer

mig~t

have with respect to such non·-employees. It Clearly,

control is a~given in the case of an employee, but is not necessarily present in the case of a non-employee and must be established .in order to establish a violation.

However, where both

knowledge and control do exist on the part of the employer', there
is an obligation under Title VII for the employer to maintain an
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of
one sex are not required to work under different and less advantageous terms and conditions of employment than' members of the
other sex.

In connection with these two subsections, some commentors
were concerned with what constitutes "appropriate corrective
action."

If the action is "corrective," that is, if it in fact

eliminates the illegal behavior, then it is appropriate; however,
actions which result in the elimination of the illegal behavior
in one workplace might not have the

place.

s~e

result in another work-

Since appropriateness will have to be determined on a

case-by-case basis,. we did not make any changes

~n

language.

I
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the original

Subsection (f) of the guidelines provides that:

Prevention ·is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.

An employer

should take all steps necessary to prevent
sexia1 harassment from occurring, such as
~

.

affirmatively raising the subject, expressing
strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing

~p~oyees

of their right

to· raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods
to sensitize all concerned.

This" subsection: contains the maj or thrust of· the guidelines,
that is "Prevention is the best tool for the el:i.mination of
sexual harassment."

The suggestions offered in" this subsection

give employers assistance in preventing an invidious form of
discrimination that inflicts substantial

psycho~ogical

damage to

its victims, in addition to the monetary damage that it inflicts.
It. is most. important when considering the issue of sexual harassment that we bear. this psychological damage in mind and recognize
that, while it is·difficult to remedy, it can, in many cases, be
prevented." 13/
.
Some commentors requested greater specificity with respect

to the examples of preventative action which an employer might
take.

The Commission decided that it would not go beyond making

the suggestions which were already set out in the guidelines. We
do not want to require that employers take previously determined
steps to prevent sexual harassment because the Commission feels

that each workplace is unique, and steps which might be effective
in one workplace might fail in another.

considered.

The cost factor was also

An extensive formalized training program might be

effective and appropriate in a large corporation, but a less
expensive,

info~al

means of communicating the employer's concerns

to managemenl and the employees might be more efficient and
effective in a 'small business.

I have also made both the

Commissioners and staff available, within budget constraints, to
speak to trade associations and other employer and employee
groups to give

furt~er

examples and to discuss ideas which

members of the groups have for preventing sexual harassment.

Several people who submitted written comments and a large
number of members of the public who telephoned

~he Co~ission

asked whether employees who are denied an employment benefit are·
covered by the guidelines when the benefit is received by a
person who is granting sexual favors to their mutual supervisor.
While we realize that this. does not state a case of sexual
~arassment,

since we assume that the employee who received the

benefit is granting the sexual favors willingly and has not been
coerqed into the

~elationshipJ

issue in the minds of the

it is· obviously· relate·d to that

public~

Therefore, the Commission

decided to add a new subsection, Subsection (g), to the guidelines
to alert employers that this related issue is aJso covered by .
Title VII.

This does not mean, and we did not state, that this

necessarily presents a vioiation of Title VII.

It merely means

that the charge is cognizable under Title VII and, if brought to
the Commission, will be decided under that statute.
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It· is important to understand that

th~s

provision affords

protection for persons who are not involved in the situation but
who, nevertheless, are adversely affected by the sexual conduct
of others.
persons in

Thus, it creates a balance of protection for all
t~e

workplace.

f

One criticism of the guidelines which was raised by a
limited number of commentors during the formal comment period but
which has been raised

f~equently

since the guidelines became

final is that they will cause an influx of frivolous charges at
EEOC.

All charges that are filed in our field offices which

involve· the-issue of sexual harassment are investigated in the
field and then sent in to Headquarters for a decision on the
merits by the Commission.
of the. case

~iles

I instructed staff to read through all

which are currently in Headquarters and to give

me a sense of the contents of those cas.e files.

The following is

the result of their reading.

There are currently 130 sexual harassment charges in Headquarters.

Of these, 118 contain corroborative evidence that
.

substantiates part, if not all, of the Charging Party's allegations. The evidence comes in the forms of admissions by Respondent,
statements of people who witnessed the sexual aqvances, statements
!

of others subjected to the same or similar cond~ct as Charging
Party, and other

statement~

of corroboration.
-13-

These cases, which will be decided on the merits, cover a
wide range of acitivity as demonstrated by the following: fiftyeight of these charges involve unwelcome

physica~

contact of a

sexual nature, such as the touching of a person's buttocks or
hugging or

k~ssing;

seventy-seven involve demands for a person to

!

~ngage

in a sexual act and the promise of a favorable employment

decision if the demand is met or the threat of a negative action
if the' demand is not met; and twenty-six involve the use of
vulgar language of a sexual nature, calling a person

sexual~y

derogatory names, making sexually derogatory comments about one
sex, or displaying sexually explicit pictures, photographs, or
cartoons.

From another point of analysis, seventy-one of the charges
were brought by women who were fired; twenty-six were brought by
women who resigned when the unwelcomed sexual activity became
intolerable; nineteen were brought by women who either were given
less desirable work assignments, had their number of hours of
work reduced, or were transfered to a different work shift; seven
were brought by women who were denied a promotion; ana seven were
brought by women-who were subjected to sexual activity which
interfered with their work performance or create? an

off~nsive

working environment.

In the 118 charges

wh~ch

were corroborated, the acts of

sexual harassment were perpetrated by supervisors or other
management officials in 106 cases and by coworkers in 12 cases .
. i

.'
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In conclusion, sexual harassment in the workplace .is not a
figment of the imagination.

It is a real problem. The sexual

harassment guidelines are designed to' assist employers in their
understanding of this sensitive public issue and to guide them in

I
developing management
training programs for their companies, and
.the .Federal government.

T~nk

you.

j.
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